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THE  
ANNUAL ADDRESS

DELIVERED AT THE

TWENTY-THIRD REUNION

OF THE

Society of the Army of the Cumberland

HELD AT

CHICKAMAUGA, GEORGIA

September 14 and 15, 1892

BY

HENRY V. BOYNTON

Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. V.

CINCINNATI  
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## ANNUAL ADDRESS

BY

GENERAL H. V. BOYNTON.

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*Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Comrades:*

We gray-beards of the *Army of the Cumberland* have met again on ground made familiar to us, both by the horrors and the glories of war, to find that the nation has risen to a due appreciation of its history and significance, and, with the consent of the states in which the fields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga lie, has raised its flag of eminent domain over them, as spots pre-eminently deserving national care and preservation.

A generation has passed since we stood here, shoulder to shoulder, doing battle for that Union and nationality which have come, and come to stay forever. It is difficult to recognize the boys of '61 in the silver hairs and changed forms and features which the afternoon of life for all of us, and its very evening for many, have stamped upon these survivors of 1892; but, in spite of these, our hearts and hands and greetings are still those of the very heyday of youth—are as strong, as earnest, and as true as when we were the boys in blue of thirty years ago. Aged men of the *Army of the Cumberland*—heroes of the *Army of the Cumberland*--I salute you, one and all.

The military committees of both Houses of Congress, by unanimous vote and formal report, have declared that upon this ground "occurred some of the most remarkable tactical movements and the deadliest fighting of the war of the rebellion;"

and Congress itself, with the same unanimity, has in the act establishing the National Military Park, declared these to be fields of "some of the most remarkable maneuvers and most brilliant fighting in the war of the rebellion." Thus pass the clouds of misrepresentation and misinformation from Chickamauga, as the nation proclaims it to have presented the best illustration of American fighting,—and all who fought were Americans, regardless of former nationality.

What has happened in regard to Chickamauga is true of the whole history of the *Army of the Cumberland*. You have often seen Lookout veiled with clouds, which, under the quickening breeze, even as you looked, were swept from its face, revealing the strength and beauty and enduring foundations of that mountain monarch. So truth has blown strongly over the history of the *Army of the Cumberland*, and the grand proportions of its record begin to stand out before all men like a mountain range above the fields of our military history; and soon, if we do our full duty, in clear air it will abide in its strength in the sight of all the people, a crowned monarch on an everlasting throne.

Through long years of controversy the *Army of the Cumberland* is coming to its own. It is doubtful whether, in military history, there can be found another army with its notably great and successful record which contemporary writers of military history—I should rather say of military fiction—have so persistently misrepresented. It is not necessary to inquire into their motives or to asperse them. The fact remains that the *Army of the Cumberland*, after winning its victories in the field, has had to fight ever since to save the true record of them for history. And it is only of recent years, when the full official record has become accessible, and as the further results of many prolonged and bitter controversies, that the myths of this distorted history are taking up their march into oblivion.

The same is true of its leading commanders—BUELL, ROSE-



CRANS and THOMAS. I am sure that in the minds of *Army of the Cumberland* men, GENERAL BUELL now stands the accredited organizer of that mighty weapon with which his successors smote. Those who came after him strengthened it and bettered it, but the first shaping and the forging were his. His troubles were inseparable from the early political period of the war. If there had been no political eclipse of the army about Washington, there would have been no corresponding penumbra visible at the West. And this shadow at the West was all suspicion. The suggestion of the Cumberland river campaign; the unsought, or at least unacknowledged assistance which saved Donelson, and the glory of Shiloh are his. For the rest, what GENERAL THOMAS saw when he twice protested against superseding GENERAL BUELL, upon the ground of its injustice, is now clear to us all. GENERAL BUELL'S name and fame are steadily growing brighter as the years cast the light of the record over his way.

And what, in the presence of our honored and beloved president, GENERAL ROSECRANS, shall I say of the light which the record has thrown over his pathway, to the confusion of many writers, both of high and of low degree? What need be said further than to name Rich Mountain, Carnifax Ferry, Iuka, Corinth and Stone River, the unparalleled strategy of the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns, and the final capture of this mountain stronghold of Chattanooga? As, in the case of GENERAL BUELL, we now know that GENERAL THOMAS vehemently protested against the proposition to remove GENERAL ROSECRANS, even going so far as to privately threaten to resign if it were finally ordered, a decision from which he was with difficulty persuaded. When GENERAL GARFIELD started for Washington, a few days before this removal, GENERAL THOMAS, in parting with him, said: "GARFIELD, you know the whole of this matter and the wrong that is being done ROSECRANS. Make it your first

business to set him right with those people in Washington." Mortifying to relate, this commission was not executed, and, as the direct result, the clouds settled thick and chill about him, and the man who will, without doubt, stand pre-eminent as the most brilliant strategist of the war, and who, by his last campaign and the capture of Chattanooga, had as effectually divided the Confederacy as had GRANT and PORTER by opening the Mississippi, was obliged to sit down in shadow and wait on the slow methods of history for his vindication. But, in the evening of his life, with his faculties to enjoy it unabated, it has come, and it will abide for him forever.

Next we come to a name that excites universal acclaim from every fair-minded student or writer of our military history wherever its wide and still-spreading fame has reached. GEORGE H. THOMAS—that great Virginian, and greater American—is rapidly coming to his own. His stature in history is rounding out to the full dimensions which we know to have been his. Of him, and of him alone, among all our great and honored captains, can it be truthfully said that he never lost a movement or a battle. Mill Springs was the first Union victory of the three years' campaign, and it was complete. We know how the center held and what it did at Stone River. The world knows the significance of his title, "The Rock of Chickamauga." Every successful feature of the three days' battles about Chattanooga was his, and not another's. Every modification of the plan of battle was his, and every portion of the plan which succeeded was modified. Had his advice, based on full reconnoissance, been followed of making a feint before the gorges at Rocky Face, and sending the army rapidly through undefended Snake Creek Gap, the decisive battle of the Atlanta campaign would have been fought in the vicinity of Resaca. He protested against Kennesaw, and his hands were clear of the blood of that needless and so wicked slaughter. He was turned back from Atlanta with the

small, but valiant Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, and the remnants which were cast off when a selected army was organized for a picnic to the sea, to do battle with these and whatever else he might gather against the whole force which had confronted the three combined Union armies from Dalton to Atlanta. Never was greater though unintentional tribute paid to his ability. The commanders whom he was saving from the sneers of mankind, railed at him from Washington and Savannah, but with an imperturbability without parallel under the circumstances, at the risk of removal, in the face of removal, and, as we know now, after the order for removal, he prepared the blow which, when it fell at Nashville, utterly destroyed the opposing army and saved the march to the sea from everlasting ridicule. And here it is pertinent to remark that this was the only great Confederate army destroyed in battle, before the final surrender, by any Union commander.

On the 28th of February, 1864, the month before GRANT was made Lieutenant-General, and SHERMAN ordered to Chattanooga, GENERAL THOMAS, having thoroughly reconnoitered the position at Dalton, thus offered to undertake an Atlanta campaign himself:

“I believe, if I can commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and Fourth Corps in front, with HOWARD’S corps in reserve, that I can move along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far, at least, as Atlanta.”

When the armies had reached Atlanta, he was much concerned over the information which reached there in relation to the suffering condition of our prisoners at Andersonville, Americus and Millen. He then proposed to SHERMAN that with the *Army of the Cumberland* he might be detached and sent to release those prisoners, and carry them with him, either to the Atlantic or one of the Gulf ports. This may have been the germinal idea which prompted the march to the sea, although,

when that march was made, both THOMAS and the prisoners were left behind.

I said that GENERAL THOMAS was the only commander in the war for whom it could be claimed that he never lost a single movement, or a battle, of his own ordering. How nearly this is also true of GENERAL ROSECRANS, our president, let his record tell—Rich Mountain, Carnifax Ferry, Iuka, Corinth, Stone River, the wonderful Tullahoma, and Chickamauga campaigns, the capture of Chattanooga—every thing from the day he entered the field until he left it, except the little which he lost on the second day of Chickamauga—and how little that was, compared with the misrepresentations of the day, the country has at last discovered. Can the great and honored commanders of any other army, just and enduring as is their fame, match these records of THOMAS and ROSECRANS?

The time has come at last, with the full disclosures of the official records, when false history, which has been long current, can be corrected and true history written. To see that this is done for the *Army of the Cumberland*, should be a pressing duty with this Society—pressing, because there is so much to correct, and because our march to the bivouac above draws rapidly toward its close.

Much has been written in direct disparagement of this army under its various titles of the *Army of the Ohio*, the Fourteenth Corps, and the *Army of the Cumberland*, and much injustice done as well in sins of historical omission by those whose names and fame and high positions gave their words great weight, and caused them to be accepted as authority, both at home and abroad. Let us briefly examine a few of these points. You will look in vain in these alleged histories for the fact that the ten thousand men sent by GENERAL BUELL, without request from GRANT, saved Donelson by driving BUCKNER back into his works when he started to cut his way out with his command. And in

this instance the commander of BUELL'S troops attacked of his own motion, as GENERAL GRANT was not at the time on the field, but in conference with COMMODORE FOOTE on the gunboats.

Here are a few of the assertions to be found in these widely accepted histories: "BUELL'S army was not needed at Shiloh." "It exerted no influence on the first day, and on the second the victory would have been complete without it." "It was doubtful whether GENERAL BUELL would cross his army over the river at all for the battle." To sustain the theory that there was no surprise and to keep the *Army of the Ohio* in the background, we find official maps, most elaborately prepared, which, in their essential features, no more resemble the real Shiloh than the current map of the planet Mars.

According to the same authorities, the *Army of the Cumberland* was inexcusably slow after Stone River; exasperatingly slow after its splendid Tullahoma campaign; was routed in disaster at Chickamauga; was so demoralized by that battle that it was feared by GENERAL GRANT that it could not be gotten out of the trenches before this city for a battle; that it might fight, he thought, after SHERMAN'S army should arrive and take the offensive first; and that THOMAS was so slow at Nashville as to call for his removal. The publication of the official history of the Atlanta campaign brings out repeated attacks upon the *Army of the Cumberland*, which were the more injurious at the time because secretly made. Witness the following extract from a semi-official letter from GENERAL SHERMAN to GENERAL GRANT, dated June 18, 1864, and now printed on page 507, of Volume 38, Part 4, of the War Records:

"My chief source of trouble is with the *Army of the Cumberland*, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on THOMAS that we must assail and not defend; we are the offensive, and yet it seems the

whole *Army of the Cumberland* is so habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the lowest private, I can not get it out of their heads."

This is a fair specimen of several similar attacks which the published record now for the first time discloses. Though the discovery of such records indicates what was going on in secret while the *Army of the Cumberland* was performing the full proportion of GENERAL SHERMAN'S work which rightly belonged to its preponderating numbers, it is altogether unnecessary before this audience to even dignify them with a denial.

These errors and others, which will occur to members of the Society, with which these histories and memoirs abound, have been too long neglected. Through a revival of cheap editions they are again gaining wide circulation. The injury they do is well illustrated by the fact that such an able and impartial writer as the Count of Paris has accepted some of them because of the weight of authority which they carried; while LORD WOOLSEY has swallowed them all with avidity from apparent inclination, and they are floating over the English-speaking world, incorporated in his thistle-down of military criticisms.

The time has come, in the interest of truthful history, to treat such things as they deserve. And the *Society of the Army of the Cumberland*, and especially its many excellent writers and close students, will fail in their duty to that army's magnificent record, to its dead heroes, and to itself, if they do not use the facilities which the published record now affords them, to stamp out venerable falsehoods which have been given currency as history and install truth in their place. There is this to encourage us in such work. With its present full access to the records, and the fact that a generation is on the stage which is learning of the war by reading and study, the country is revising many of the estimates which were formed in the hot atmosphere of actual war. In this revision of conclusions, it is



pleasant to note that the *Army of the Cumberland*, the country over, is rapidly being conceded that leading rank to which we, who knew, and loved, and trusted its commanders, and helped them fight their battles, know it to be entitled.

In spite of all the gross errors of statement to which reference has been made, but three things can be cited in its history which come even within the range of failures. These are the withdrawal to the Ohio, as a result of BRAGG'S flanking movement; the escape of BRAGG after Perryville and the disaster of Kenesaw. The first was held by many men of recognized military ability to be both wise and necessary, and the only movement by which the Confederates could certainly be turned back from Kentucky, and Louisville and Cincinnati saved. The second was relieved by the fact that it was a victory to the extent of again clearing Kentucky of the enemy and driving him back to Central Tennessee, while the entire odium of the failure and the needless slaughter of Kenesaw falls wholly outside of the lines of that army upon the one who ordered the butchery.

When the commanders of other armies, either as authors, or in the person of writers who hold the formal indorsement of these commanders, write of the failures of our army, and whose sole liberality toward it are the liberalities of criticism, it is but fair to institute comparisons.

Belmont was a disaster; Shiloh was unquestionably an inexcusable surprise; Chickasaw Bayou was an assault without possibilities of success; the Meridian campaign fell short; there was dire failure in one attack on Vicksburg; the only miscarriage in the battle of Chattanooga was at the north end of Missionary Ridge; the bloody battle of Atlanta, where the commander of the *Army of the Tennessee* was killed, resulted from the mistaken announcement from the headquarters of the armies that Atlanta was evacuated, coupled with a general order for pursuit, which plunged one army marching by the flank, unex-

peetedly into the enemy's lines. These are comparisons, by way of criticisms, that only concern commanders. But, in citing them, we do not forget that they won many glorious victories whose fame will never fade from our national history. These are failures, too, which do not in any sense detract from the splendid courage and unflinching fighting ability of the subordinate officers and soldiers who endured the hardships, suffered the wounds, or died because of these mistakes. Nor is it an attack upon GENERAL GRANT or GENERAL SHERMAN to apply the test of the official records to their histories. Whatever passes that test will stand. All else of right should fall, and if we do our duty, will fall. The fame of these great captains is assured beyond the power of pen or word to destroy it. Their great services to the state will cause their names to live among the heroes of the republic so long as the nation's story shall be preserved for the ages to come. But it is not necessary to dim other records to brighten their's. In spite of spots, they will shine forever. If our Society does its duty, it will devote much attention henceforth to the subject of the full and truthful history of that renowned army in which we served. Thus will all our noble armies, each and all of glorious record, come to their own.

Why not, for example, tell the truth about Shiloh, when by so doing we establish it as one of the chief glories of the *Army of the Tennessee*? This is that story: Camped in a forest without regard to a line of battle, its commander nine miles away, with no adequate outpost or picket service, it was surprised at daylight and thrown into much disorder by an army in regular and solid array bursting into its camps. But, in spite of these facts and the additional truth that thousands in its ranks had never met an enemy in arms, they sprang to their places and resisted, as they could, through all the long hours of that first day, and resisted with a courage which, under the circumstances, was phenomenal and worthy of everlasting praise; and under



the brilliant example of SHERMAN and the stubborn command of GRANT, they stood at nightfall broken, it is true, but unconquered, between BEAUREGARD and the Tennessee, and when morning came, clasping the outstretched hand of BUELL'S sncoring army, they advanced again with it to final and complete victory.

Here is truth bestowing lasting honor. Turn from this for a moment to the overwhelming severity of criticism upon generalship which the false theory that there was no surprise renders unavoidable. Let it be conceded that the commanding generals expected an attack. Then what shall be said of the generalship which allowed an entire army to go to sleep in utter ignorance of the fact that those in command were looking for it? Or, of those other facts that no subordinate officers were informed and urged to prepare their lines for battle; that ordnance officers were not enlightened, so that ammunition might be provided; that commissaries and quartermasters were not allowed to know of the danger, in order that they might withdraw or otherwise protect their stores; that medical officers were not informed, so that their vitally important preparations might be made—in short, if there was no surprise, upon what possible theory which presupposes the faintest elements of generalship, shall the neglect of these most ordinary and imperative preparations for battle be explained or excused?

If there be a spot within the territory of the war where *Army of the Cumberland* men can meet and talk freely, frankly and without reserve, of the great events in which they were actors, surely it is this city of Chattanooga, that heard the guns on Snodgrass Hill, and the Kelley field, and which lies in the shadows of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge.

The campaign which secured it was of GENERAL ROSECRANS' planning and execution. The subsequent opening of the river to supply it was his plan also, the details being decided upon

and carried out by GENERAL W. F. SMITH after GENERAL GRANT'S arrival. Although GENERAL GRANT was in command, and announced his order of battle, the battle of Chattanooga as fought was, in every thing which made it a success, the battle of GENERAL THOMAS.

The Chickamauga campaign was beyond question the most brilliant strategic campaign of the war. The natural obstacles to be overcome were far greater than in any other. The position of the enemy could not have been stronger. The diversion by which the crossings of the river were secured and the mountain passes seized was in itself a campaign. The front of the movement when it had crossed the Cumberland ranges and reached the valley of the Tennessee was 150 miles—more than the whole distance from Washington to Richmond, and every element of it moved with precision and without the slightest failure. Before BRAGG had more than suspected the character of the movement, and before he could recall his army, which had been sent far up the river to meet the expected attempt at crossing there, ROSECRANS' heads of columns were in the passes of Lookout, and descending the eastern slope of the mountain in rear of Chattanooga, and BRAGG could only save his communications and his army by evacuating the place.

Then came the deadly battle of Chickamauga for the military possession of this town. BRAGG, reinforced from Richmond by LONGSTREET, started again toward Chattanooga, planning to thrust his columns between ROSECRANS and the city. The latter, by a night march, playing at the same game, succeeded in placing his head of column in the Chickamauga forests between BRAGG and Chattanooga, and the fierce struggle for the roads to the city began. When it ended, a new record of bitter, persistent, and deadly fighting had been made, not only for our war but for the modern world. In percentages of losses and for the time of fighting there are no battle records which equal it from

and including the days of the first NAPOLEON. It was, for both sides, as the figures of strength and losses show, the best illustration of the pluck, the endurance, and the stubborn, dogged courage of American soldiers which the war produced. And now that the bitterness of it has all passed, it is well for the nation to mark this field and preserve it as an object-lesson of what Americans can do in war.

The generally received version of Chickamauga has been that at its close the Union army retreated to Chattanooga. When the battle began, it was on the march for the city, which from the first had been the objective of the campaign. When the battle ended, the march of the Union army was still in advance, not in retreat, and still for the occupation of Chattanooga. As an army, it had never seen the city, and it did not see it till the second morning after Chickamauga. In a military sense, it had not yet been occupied by the Union army, and the battle of Chickamauga was to decide which side should gain possession of it. In the words of another, "Chickamauga was the price of Chattanooga." This mountain stronghold was worth the cost.

At the East, and, in fact, in many portions of the country, the magnitude of the operations, both as regards territory and numbers, in which the *Army of the Cumberland* engaged, has not been fully comprehended. Let us institute a few comparisons with the *Army of the Potomac*. It operated mainly between Washington and Richmond. Here are some of the successive steps of the *Army of the Cumberland* in its advances: From the Ohio river to Central Kentucky; thence to Central Tennessee; thence to Northern Mississippi; thence across Alabama to Eastern Tennessee; thence back across both Tennessee and Kentucky to the Ohio; thence again to Central Kentucky, to Central Tennessee, to Northern Georgia. And these giant strides only bring it to the threshold of the Atlanta campaign. Let us make a single comparison to bring out the character of its fighting:

The *Army of the Cumberland*, at Chickamauga, had only two less infantry regiments than the *Army of the Potomac* in the Seven Days' Battles, and BRAGG had only three less than the *Army of Northern Virginia* in those battles, a total difference for the combined armies of only five regiments of infantry. The losses of ROSECRANS at Chickamauga in two days were 16,179, and of McCLELLAN in the Seven Days' only 15,849, or 330 less than ROSECRANS; of BRAGG in two days, 17,804; of LEE in Seven Days', 19,749. ROSECRANS' missing, notwithstanding the long-current exaggerations of the disaster to his right, were only 4,774, against 6,053 in the Seven Days' Battles. The total losses of both sides in the Seven Days' Battles were only 1,615 more than ROSECRANS' and BRAGG's for the two days at Chickamauga.

Concerning the widely-repeated statement that GENERAL ROSECRANS, immediately upon reaching Chattanooga, decided to abandon it, this is true, namely, that ROSECRANS was established around the city during the 22d of September. The afternoon of that day there was some consideration given at headquarters to the question of retreat to the north side of the river in case reinforcements could not be speedily forwarded, and dispatches designed to make this reinforcement appear most urgent were sent to Washington. But that very evening the question was finally decided, and the decision, as telegraphed to Washington by MR. DANA, was to hold the town at all hazards. Two days later, he reported it so strong that it could only be taken by regular siege.

GENERAL ROSECRANS has been severely criticised by unfriendly writers for abandoning Lookout Mountain shortly after his occupation of Chattanooga, upon the theory that he thus yielded the control of the river to BRAGG. We, who are acquainted with the ground, know the fallacy of this criticism. To have maintained a line from Chattanooga to the crest of Lookout

Mountain merely to hold that position, would have made necessary a heavy fortified line three miles in extent and open to most favorable lines of attack, and this would have in no sense controlled the river, since BRAGG held the roads over the mountain. He could have established a force at a point on the river beyond the range of the guns on Lookout, and still have effectually closed that line of supplies. ROSECRANS' withdrawal from the mountain, therefore, greatly strengthened his position at Chattanooga, and exposed him to no additional dangers, either from the closing of the river or BRAGG'S batteries on the mountain, since the latter were at no time able to inflict any serious damage upon the Union forces.

By the middle of October, the question of holding the city turned on that of supplying the troops. A raid of WHEELER'S cavalry, north of the river, the 1st of October, had destroyed between two hundred and fifty and three hundred wagons. The rains which followed made it impossible to haul much more than forage to last the trains over the sixty miles of mountains. However, October 13, the army was receiving three-fourths rations, and was very comfortable, and that very day three hundred thousand full rations arrived. The animals suffered greatly, for corn was taken from them for the men. Although the army was on very short rations, at no time did the men actually suffer, and at no time were the troops of the *Army of the Cumberland*, as an army, either discouraged or demoralized. All statements to the contrary, and such have gained wide currency, are of that class of historical myths which are fast disappearing under impartial study.

There were controversies over the responsibility for the disaster to the right wing at Chickamauga, and sharp criticisms of several officers, including the general in command, and other indications of this kind of demoralization. But the *Army of the Cumberland*, as an army, never complained of its short supplies,

never for a moment lost the spirit which held the bulk of it on the Horseshoe under THOMAS that Sunday afternoon at Chickamanga, and, so far as the spirits of the men were concerned, there was never a day when its lines could not have been led against Missionary Ridge with the same magnificent élan as that which finally planted its victorious banners along the crest. Men followed the wagons for the crumbs of crackers which they could pick up; they gathered the scattered kernels of corn about the store houses, for parching; they ate moldy crackers, and sour pork—when they could get it—and all the time looked up at the smoking batteries on Lookout, or out on the enemy's flags along Missionary Ridge, with the same grim determination and exultation with which, on Snodgrass Hill, when their ammunition was gone, they awaited LONGSTREET'S assaults, and repelled them time and again with their empty barrels and bayonets.

But the river line of supplies to Kelly's Ferry was opened at length, the problem of holding the town was finally solved, and the prophecy of starvation and disaster uttered by JEFFERSON DAVIS from the Point of Lookout was brought to nought.

It is another of the myths of history—which are as thick about these operations as the fogs over Lookout in falling weather—that the coming of GRANT had something to do with this opening of the river. True, he approved plans which he found perfected down to the smallest details. But these would have been executed exactly in their final form and time, if GRANT had not been ordered to Chattanooga.

The general plan of opening the Tennessee to the vicinity of William's Island was ROSECRANS' own. The details were committed to GENERAL W. F. SMITH. He fixed on Brown's Ferry as the place for throwing the bridges, and GENERAL ROSECRANS was engaged in the general reconnoitering of the river below Lookout the day that the order for his relief from the command arrived. That very day he had ordered HOOKER



to be ready to move up from Bridgeport along the south bank of the river, and that night, upon assuming command, one of GENERAL THOMAS'S first orders was to direct HOOKER to be ready to execute GENERAL ROSECRANS' last order. GRANT came, approved the plans already fully perfected and gave orders for their execution—nothing more. They were executed and the line of abundant supply was open.

It is now possible to fix the responsibility for this lack of supplies at Chattanooga where it properly belongs. When that wonderful transfer of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Potomac to the Tennessee was ordered, GENERAL ROSECRANS had a right to suppose that upon GENERAL HOOKER'S arrival at Bridgeport he would be able to co-operate at once for the relief of Chattanooga. HOOKER reached that point October 1, and the same day was ordered by ROSECRANS to put down his bridges and make immediate preparations for crossing the river to move toward Chattanooga. Then it was found that he had no wagon trains, and so he could not obey.

The finely equipped and thoroughly efficient field trains of these two Eastern corps had been turned in at Alexandria and orders issued that new trains should be furnished at Nashville. But the Nashville depot had been thoroughly depleted, having only exhausted animals and crippled wagons. When at length apologies for trains had been fitted up, the extra Eastern railroad rolling stock had been sent back, and these wagon trains were obliged to march 125 miles, much of the way over rough and mountain roads, to Bridgeport. As a result, HOOKER was held immovable at that point from October 1 to October 27th—in other words throughout the entire time of short supplies at Chattanooga. Had his trains been shipped from the East, so as to follow his troops, he could have occupied the Wauhatchie Valley during the first week in October: or, in other words, before the pinch over short supplies at Chattanooga began.

On October 12, GENERAL ROSECRANS repeated his order to HOOKER to move up to Wauhatchie to open the river, but his trains were still behind. On the 19th, the order to be ready to move was again given by ROSECRANS, and repeated the same night by THOMAS, who then had succeeded to the command. Finally, on the 25th and 26th, HOOKER'S trains arrived. At daylight of the 27th he crossed the river at Bridgeport, the rear of his column passing the bridge at 9:30 A. M. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day he was at Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley; and at 5 o'clock at Brown's Ferry, and the line of supplies was open. It is easily seen that the failure to send HOOKER'S splendidly-equipped trains from the East, upon the erroneous belief that this essential need could be supplied at Nashville, is the historical fact which so nearly caused starvation at Chattanooga.

While Chickamauga is fast coming out into the light, and the nation is beginning to fairly understand it, there are several important points of widely accepted but most erroneous history connected with the battle of Missionary Ridge, which deserve attention. I have said that the battle of Chattanooga, though planned and ordered by GENERAL GRANT, was GENERAL THOMAS'S battle in all its successful features. As is well known, it was fought by the *Army of the Cumberland* proper, to which was assigned GENERAL HOOKER'S Eastern army, and the *Army of the Tennessee* under GENERAL SHERMAN, GENERAL GRANT being in command of the whole.

The plan of battle, as announced in orders by GENERAL GRANT, involved the holding of Lookout valley by GENERAL HOOKER, and his observation of BRAGG'S left; the crossing of the Tennessee at night by GENERAL SHERMAN, opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge, and carrying the ridge at daylight by surprise as far south as the tunnel. This was the central and controlling feature of the plan of battle. GENERAL THOMAS was



then to close to the left, in front of Chattanooga, unite with SHERMAN'S right, and advancing up the valley, as SHERMAN swept southward along the ridge, and conforming to his movements, protect the flank of the *Army of the Tennessee*, while it conducted the main work of the battle, and assist in this position of minor importance and restricted activities, in driving BRAGG from his depot and communications at Chickamauga station.

Three days in succession the order for battle was postponed because SHERMAN had not been able to get up at the appointed time. Then, at GENERAL THOMAS'S request, the plan of battle was so changed as to allow HOOKER to assault Lookout, and the time for his move was fixed for November 24th. Meantime, there was intense anxiety at headquarters while awaiting SHERMAN, lest BRAGG should learn the plans for attack; and a report that the enemy was withdrawing led GRANT, on the 23d of November, to order GENERAL THOMAS to make a reconnoissance in front of the city to ascertain whether the camps and earth-works there were still occupied. Of his own accord THOMAS turned this into an advance of his army, and, sweeping out from Fort Wood with a front of two divisions, supported by three on the flanks, he carried and reversed, and held the enemy's central lines through the plain. This was an entire departure from the plan of battle. The next day came the memorable assault and successful carrying of Lookout Mountain by HOOKER, acting under orders from THOMAS—a second and most radical departure from the plan.

Here, in the shadow of Lookout, let us revive our recollections of that scene when the flag of the Union was borne on the rising flood of battle to its very crest. HOOKER, for the assault, had GEARY'S division of the Twelfth Corps, OSTERHAUS' of the Fifteenth, and CRUFT'S of the Fourteenth. With these in battle array at the western foot of the mountain in Lookout Valley, the notable and never-to-be-forgotten movement began. Here,

these soldiers from the *Army of the Potomac*, from the *Army of the Tennessee*, and the *Army of the Cumberland* met for the first time as they faced the mountain, and fought together through the day for its possession.

Listen, my friends, those of you who listened twenty-nine years ago to the hoarse grumble of HOOKER'S guns rolling up with the mists from Lookout Valley, and see if you do not hear them still. Ah, yes! They come to you as they come to me. The ears which heard them then must be dulled by death before they will cease to respond to such entreating.

Upon that morning the roars of battle approaching from Lookout Valley had intently fixed all eyes in both lines about Chattanooga upon the point of the mountain. But, while the battle drew rapidly nearer from the western side, the mists concealed all movements. Just as the Confederate lines had been pushed back till they reached from the foot of the palisades under the point of the mountain to the river bluffs below, the fogs were widely rent, as if the curtain in some great play-house of the gods had been raised to show this tremendous battle scene on those slopes reaching upward toward the skies. For a little season the sun shone over the wonderful but indescribable picture, gleamed brightly on banners and bayonets, and rested softly on the white billows of the powder smoke. For an instant both armies looked on in silence, while each observer was solving the situation for himself. But a glance showed clearly that the Confederate lines were coming back, and, a moment later, the banners of the Union, flag after flag, came into sight, streaming forward above the curling surf of battle smoke. Then the Union army, stretched across the plain below, cheered and cheered, and all the bands played on and on, while HOOKER'S men, under this inspiration, and aided by the enfilading fire of BRANNAN'S heavy batteries on Moccasin Point, swept the

northern face of the mountain. Then the curtain of fog settled down again, as if the giant play were done.

At 5 o'clock, by THOMAS's order, CARLIN's Brigade, from the *Army of the Cumberland*, in the plain before the city, climbed the mountain, with stores of ammunition, to HOOKER's position, and relieved his right under the palisades—a most energetic, courageous, and brilliant movement well performed. There was sharp skirmishing through most of the night, but this was to cover the Confederate withdrawal from the top of the mountain by the Summertown road. At daylight it was found that the summit had been abandoned. It had been a day's fight. It will live in history forever.

The morning of the 25th broke bright and clear. The mountain was sharply defined against the sky. All the camps were astir at the earliest dawn, and every eye was searching for signs which would show who held the summit. Just before sunrise a group of soldiers stepped out on the rock which forms the overhanging point of the mountain. They carried a flag, but held it furled, waiting for the sun. The instant its rays broke full upon them, they loosened its folds, and the waiting thousands below beheld the Stars and Stripes. Then the cheers throughout the valley roared again like Niagara, and the pealing of the bands was as if all the harps of heaven were filling the dome with triumphal music. The day of HOOKER's assault, SHERMAN having crossed the Tennessee during the night, moved in the afternoon, instead of at daylight as contemplated, toward Missionary Ridge, but by a mistake in reconnoissance occupied and fortified a detached range of unoccupied hills in the valley of the Tennessee, instead of the north end of the ridge. This move was without opposition, even from pickets. The next day SHERMAN assaulted the real extremity of the ridge, and, although such troops as he ordered forward fought with desperate valor, his movement was altogether unsuccessful.

In the afternoon, in order to relieve SHERMAN, THOMAS was ordered to advance the center against the rifle pits at the foot of the ridge. He did more. He sent his center to the summit, while his right under HOOKER turned BRAGG's left—and the battle of Chattanooga was won. Thus, while everything which made the battle the wonderful success it proved to be, was the result of modifications secured or caused by GENERAL THOMAS, it is gravely asserted in one of the leading authorized histories to which reference has already been made, that this was one of the few battles of the war, fought from first to last, exactly according to the original plan.

The only modification of the plan suggested by GENERAL THOMAS, and not accepted by GENERAL GRANT, was that SHERMAN's army should be brought into Chattanooga by night over the existing bridges, and marched along the south bank of the river to its proposed position opposite the north point of Missionary Ridge, instead of undertaking the enormous work and incurring the risks of delay and accident incident to crossing 20,000 men by night from North Chickamauga. But GRANT, finding the north end of Missionary Ridge unoccupied, thought it could be best secured by this latter crossing and a following surprise, and directed GENERAL THOMAS to make the preparations for it. In spite of storm and floods, and almost impassable roads, these were completed on time, as it was certain they would be under those able engineers, GENERALS W. F. SMITH and JAMES H. WILSON, and every thing was ready for GENERAL SHERMAN's part, which was to arrive, march over, and surprise the north end of Missionary Ridge. That no such exhaustive work was necessary, is shown by the fact that GENERAL HOWARD, accompanied only by his escort and three regiments of infantry, rode up from Chattanooga, along the south bank of the river, and was the first to welcome GENERAL SHERMAN as he came over the bridge. As if to emphasize the meaning of this and vindi-

cate GENERAL THOMAS'S proposed modification of the plan, HOWARD left his troops with SHERMAN and rode back to the city with his escort alone. If there could be any thing comical in war, this meeting would deserve the attention of the wits.

To make this situation the more remarkable, at daylight, when GENERAL SHERMAN had two divisions aggregating 8,000 men in line facing Missionary Ridge, there was no enemy in force, either on the ridge or along its base, within two miles and a half of GENERAL SHERMAN'S position. Further than this, none of the Confederate forces on the ridge were nearer than a mile and a quarter from the hill over the tunnel, which was his objective, until after two o'clock of the day he crossed the river, nor were any ordered toward it till that hour. If he had marched at daylight for Tunnel Hill, as was contemplated by the order of battle, he could have occupied the entire north end of Missionary Ridge, not only to the tunnel, but for some distance south of it, without encountering a Confederate in arms.

He moved to attack the ridge at one o'clock in the afternoon, having five divisions in his column. It was not until two o'clock that CLEBURNE, then on Missionary Ridge, a mile and a quarter south of Tunnel Hill, was instructed to move to that point to resist SHERMAN. CLEBURNE did not occupy the position until 2:30 P. M. It was not entrenched when he reached it, and throughout the afternoon he had only three brigades, and one battery with each, with which to hold it against SHERMAN'S five divisions.

But the astonishing error, an error which caused utter failure to the whole movement against BRAGG'S right, and which ever since has been covered thick in official reports and misleading histories, was the first day's occupation of the range of detached hills north and west of Missionary Ridge, and completely separated from it by a wide pass which cuts down to the bases of the hill. Since the plan of battle turned on occupying

the north end of the ridge, it was certainly one of the most remarkable oversights of the war, that this position was not thoroughly identified. Even the John Phoenix method of preliminary reconnoitering, namely, when roads, distances, and positions were not known, or had been omitted from his notes, to stop at a farm-house, and ask a citizen, would have answered the purpose, since every field-hand in the vicinity of the landing could have given the needed information.

So, at daylight of the 25th, when SHERMAN found himself on a crest, one thousand yards distant from CLEBURNE'S works on the real north point of Missionary Ridge, with a deep gorge between the lines, in order to assault the enemy's position he was obliged to move down an open slope, under the direct fire of the Confederate guns and rifles, and then up the steep ascent opposite to his fortified lines.

Nevertheless, SHERMAN moved promptly. His lines suffered heavily in the descent, to the foot of Missionary Ridge, and were repulsed in the direct assaults which followed. HOWARD'S remaining division had been hurried toward him from the center at an early hour, thus giving him six divisions against the five brigades then at the control of CLEBURNE, on SHERMAN'S front. After a second repulse, BAIRD'S division was dispatched from the extreme right of THOMAS'S advanced lines to SHERMAN'S assistance, leaving THOMAS with only three divisions. When BAIRD arrived there was no place, with the six divisions already on the ground, to put him in, and he was sent back to THOMAS, fortunately reaching the left of the latter's line just in time for the grand assault of the *Army of the Cumberland* on the center.

This seems to be the proper place to give the needed attention to that venerable but still stalwart misstatement that SHERMAN'S assault caused BRAGG to so weaken his center as to make THOMAS'S assault there successful. All reports, memoirs, and



histories to the contrary, nothing of the kind occurred. Not a single regiment or a single piece of artillery was withdrawn from in front of the *Army of the Cumberland* at any time during the day.

It is best to present the contrary statements in their boldest and most authoritative form. Says GRANT in his report: "Discovering that the enemy, in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of SHERMAN, was weakening his center on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance (of THOMAS) at once."

GRANT thus wrote SHERMAN at the close of the fight: "No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which THOMAS's troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your command in taking, first, so much of the same range of hills, and then in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make THOMAS's part certain of success."

GRANT, in his memoirs, says: "From the position I occupied I could see column after column of BRAGG's forces moving against SHERMAN. Every Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him."

SHERMAN, in his report of the battle, says: "Column after column of the enemy was streaming toward me. Gun after gun poured its concentric shot on us from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of the ground held by us" (and when he saw that THOMAS was moving on the center), "I knew our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemy to our flank, and felt sure of the result."

Says BADEAU, in his "Military History of GRANT": "GRANT was watching the progress of the fight from Orchard Knob. . . . A massive column of BRAGG's force soon was seen to move northward along the crest of the ridge, regiment after regiment filing toward SHERMAN. . . . GRANT had

marked the movement of the rebel column toward his left and instantly perceived his opportunity. BRAGG was attempting the most difficult maneuver that can be executed in war. He was weakening his center and making a flank movement in the presence of an enemy. . . . He (GRANT) determined to order the assault."

And again :

"SHERMAN'S assault began, and was so determined, and at so critical a point, that BRAGG threw battalion after battalion to resist the *Army of the Tennessee*. That army was indeed resisted : was unable to make its way ; but this was accomplished only by the sacrifice of all that BRAGG was fighting for. The rebel center, as GRANT had foreseen, was weakened to save the right, and then the whole mass of the *Army of the Cumberland* was precipitated on the weakened point ; the center was pierced, the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga won."

In the face of all these statements, I repeat that not a single Confederate soldier was withdrawn from THOMAS'S front to SHERMAN'S on this final day of the battle. All the Confederate reports are clear and specific on this point. They tell, in detail, what was done.

At daylight of November 25th, three brigades of CLEBURNE'S division, namely SMITH, LOWREY and GOVAN, with three batteries, were intrenched at Tunnel Hill in front of SHERMAN. At sunrise, BROWN'S brigade of STEVENSON'S division arrived near the tunnel from Lookout Mountain, and at 9 o'clock CUMMING'S brigade of the same division arrived and reported to CLEBURNE, and this comprised his whole force up to 2:30 P. M. of the 25th. On the night of the 23d, after the capture of Orchard Knob, WALKER'S division had been brought from the eastern foot of Lookout, and posted on Missionary Ridge, considerably north of THOMAS'S front, and three-quarters of a mile from Tunnel Hill. At 2 P. M. of the 25th, MANEY'S brigade of this di-



vision was dispatched to CLEBURNE. And this latter move represents the whole of the "streaming along Missionary Ridge toward SHERMAN" for the entire period after the battle opened, except the march of one small regiment of BROWN's brigade of STEVENSON's division, which was belated by coming down from Lookout by a circuitous route. This movement of MANEY from far north of THOMAS's position, and the maneuvering of CLEBURNE's forces in the vicinity of Tunnel Hill, form the sole basis for the visual errors of the day, and the subsequent persistent and remarkable distortion of history.

While CLEBURNE had six brigades besides the three guarding his bridges available against SHERMAN's six divisions of seventeen brigades, in his congratulations after the battle to those who fought it he thus wrote :

"It is but justice for me to state that the brunt of this long day's fight was borne by SMITH's (Texas) brigade, and the Second, Fifteenth, and Twenty-fourth Arkansas (consolidated), of GOVAN's brigade, together with SWEET's and KEY's batteries. The remainder of my division was only engaged in heavy skirmishing. The final charge was participated in, and successful, through the timely appearance and gallant assistance of the regiments of CUMMING's and MANEY's brigades, before mentioned. . . . I suffered the following losses in the three brigades of my division engaged, viz.: 42 killed, 178 wounded, and 2 missing. . . . My thanks are also due to BRIGADIER-GENERALS POLK and LOWREY and COLONEL GOVAN, commanding brigades. Although not actually engaged, they were rendering good service in holding important positions. . . . BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. BROWN's brigade (STEVENSON's division), on my left flank, was engaged in heavy skirmishing most of the day."

Of course that portion of SHERMAN's force which was engaged, fought with splendid courage and suffered heavy losses. But, astonishing as it seems, it is nevertheless true that of the

seventeen brigades under SHERMAN'S command throughout the day in front of CLEBURNE'S position, eleven were not at any time brought into action. Of HOWARD'S two divisions of five brigades only one brigade was sent into the fight. GENERAL JEFF. C. DAVIS, whose division from the *Army of the Cumberland* numbered 7,000 men, asked permission of GENERAL SHERMAN to assault the ridge from its eastern base, where the slope was comparatively gradual, but was refused, and he took no part in the action. Neither histories, memoirs, nor reports give any explanations of these remarkable facts.

It is pleasant to turn from these errors, myths, and mysteries of the left, to the grand culmination of that memorable day at the center, namely, to that miracle of military story, the storming of Missionary Ridge by the *Army of the Cumberland*.

During the day THOMAS'S center lines faced the ridge for two miles and a half at an average distance of a mile from the crest and in plain view of the troops in the earthworks at the base and along the summit. He was waiting, according to directions, for SHERMAN'S forces to carry the ridge to the tunnel, when he was to join their right for the movement up the valley. Meantime THOMAS had early sent HOWARD'S two divisions to help SHERMAN, and at 11 o'clock had also dispatched BAIRD to his assistance. The latter returned at 2:30 and took position on the left of THOMAS'S line, which was then formed, as already described, from right to left, as follows: JOHNSON, two brigades; SHERIDAN, WOOD, and BAIRD, each three brigades—in all eleven brigades and four batteries. Before him stretched a plain, for the most part open or very thinly wooded, extending to the earthworks at the foot of the ridge. Half way up the rough, steep, rocky and tangled slope was a lighter line of rifle pits, and above them the works along the crest. These defenses above and below were held in THOMAS'S front by four divisions, STEWART'S on BRAGG'S left, next BATE, then ANDERSON, then CHEATHAM, and

sixteen batteries, all the latter on the summit, and two siege pieces at BRAGG'S headquarters—in all, fourteen brigades of infantry, and the artillery just mentioned—a very different situation from that at the north end of the ridge, where seventeen Union brigades were confronted by only six.

At 3 o'clock THOMAS'S lines stood ready to advance. The front was two miles and a half—the column four lines deep and covered with a cloud of skirmishers. This was a battle array of those soldiers of whom SHERMAN wrote thus in his Memoirs, citing GRANT as his authority: "The men of THOMAS'S army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga, that he (GRANT) feared they could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive. The *Army of the Cumberland* had been so long in the trenches that he (GRANT) wanted my troops to hurry up, to take the offensive first, after which he had no doubt the *Cumberland Army* would fight well."

Standing before those frowning and embattled heights, rising 500 feet above the plain, trenched with earthworks, held by superior numbers, gleaming with bayonets, and with sixteen batteries ready to open upon them at the first steps of an advance, what would those grovelers from the trenches do? True, three brigades of their fellows of the Chickamauga field had helped HOOKER storm Lookout, and this very line itself had swept out from the city and carried the central entrenchments along which they stood. But they had not yet received the inspiration which might have been derived from seeing SHERMAN'S troops fight. They only knew of him that the battle orders had been countermanded three days in succession because he was not on time, and they had just heard that he had failed to carry the north end of the ridge, which was the key movement of the battle. What could these burrowers in trenches do? There was to be a signal of six guns from Orchard Knob to test that question.

At 3:15 o'clock they began to sound. Every man of the

20,000 counted. At the sixth discharge there went up a mighty cheer, which rolled over the plains and re-echoed from the surrounding mountains. Eighty-nine regiments rushed for the earthworks at the base of the ridge—every soldier like an arrow shot from a string which had long been drawn to its full tension. Great guns in the outer works of the city threw shells over their heads, at base and slopes, and crest before them. Riflemen in the Confederate earthworks and belching batteries above pelted them with the varied hail of battle. The sun swung low in the west. It never looked, in all its shining over battle-fields upon a more imposing rush. Two miles and a half of gleaming rifle barrels, line after line of them, and more than 150 banners blossoming along the advance. Not a straggler—only the killed and wounded dropped from those ranks. They swept over the lower earthworks, capturing many prisoners, and, except on the part of the line where there was a brief confusion of orders, they every-where swarmed up the slopes. The colors rushed in advance, and the men crowded toward the banners. Each regiment became a wedge-shaped mass, the flags at the cutting edge cleaving the way to the summit. Without faltering, without a stay, the flags went on—not long, it is sadly true, in the same hands, but always in willing hands, and in an hour from the sounding of the signal guns for starting, the crest for three miles was crowned with the Stars and Stripes, BRAGG'S whole center was in flight, and forty of his guns and 2,000 prisoners were in the hands of THOMAS'S victorious army. The sun, which at its rising lighted up that one flag on Lookout, smiled at its setting on the countless banners which a storming army had planted along the crest of Missionary Ridge.

And here we are met with another of the persistent myths of history, and are told that Missionary Ridge was carried without orders and solely by the inspiration of the lines, and that the movement only contemplated carrying the rifle pits at the base.

HOOKER'S column had been sent forward from Lookout toward Rossville, at 10 o'clock. The destruction of the bridge over Chattanooga Creek delayed him till 1 o'clock. GRANT says in his report that HOOKER'S advance astride the ridge at Rossville was to be the signal for "storming the ridge in the center with strong columns," but seeing SHERMAN pressed and believing that HOOKER must be near, he ordered THOMAS to move forward his force "and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines in the rifle-pits, with a view to carrying the top of the ridge. These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive—stopped but a moment until the whole were in line—and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy without further orders." While, during the night, GENERAL GRANT had written GENERAL THOMAS: "Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them or move to the left as the presence of the enemy may require," thus leaving the question of assaulting the ridge to his discretion, still, at the time GRANT ordered the *Army of the Cumberland* forward, he did not then intend a move beyond the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge. This is clear from the statement of GENERAL J. S. FULLERTON in his "Century" article. He was then the Adjutant-General and chief-of-staff of the Fourth Corps, and being on Orchard Knob at the time heard what he thus relates:

"As soon as this movement (up the ridge) was seen from Orchard Knob, GRANT turned quickly to THOMAS, who stood by his side, and I heard him say angrily: 'THOMAS, who ordered those men up the ridge?' THOMAS replied in his usual slow, quiet manner: 'I don't know, I did not.' Then addressing GENERAL GORDON GRANGER, he said: 'Did you order them up, GRANGER?' 'No,' said GRANGER, 'they started up without orders.

When those fellows get started nothing can stop them.' GENERAL GRANT said something to the effect that somebody would suffer if it did not turn out well, and then turning, stoically watched the ridge. He gave no further orders."

Now, let us see what orders GENERAL THOMAS gave his line. They are found in GENERAL BAIRD'S report: "I had just completed the establishment of my line and was upon the left of it when a staff officer from MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS brought verbal orders to move forward to the edge of the open ground which bordered the foot of Missionary Ridge, within striking distance of the rebel rifle-pits at its base, so as to be ready at a signal, which would be the firing of six guns from Orchard Knob, to dash forward and take those pits. He added this was intended as precautionary to a general assault on the mountain, and that it was doubtless designed by the Major-General commanding that I should take part in this movement, so that I would be following his wishes were I to push on to the summit. I gave the necessary orders to the Third Brigade, and, passing on to the right, was in the act of communicating them to COLONEL VAN DERVEER, of the Second, when firing from Orchard Knob began." GENERAL BAIRD was even more explicit in communicating these orders to GENERAL VAN DERVEER. Looking up at the ridge, he said: "VAN DERVEER, it is evidently too steep for riding. You had better order your regimental officers to leave their horses." And the field officers of that command led the charge across the plain and up the ridge on foot. It is unnecessary to discuss with this audience whether such orders, given in advance of starting, contemplated going to the top. At any rate, they served that purpose well. Likewise, on the other flank of GENERAL THOMAS'S line, the understanding was clear before starting that the crest was the objective. GEORGE MARSH, now of the Quartermaster's Department in Washington, was then a first sergeant in CARLIN'S Brigade, which had rejoined



JOHNSON'S line from HOOKER'S column and formed the right of the storming line, has furnished a copy of his daily diary, and written in it at the time is this: "We descended (Look-out) and prepared to assault Missionary Ridge, which is four or five miles long and 400 or 500 feet high. We formed an immense line of battle in some woods at 3:15 p. m., where our Brigadier-General, W. P. CARLIN, of Illinois, said to us: 'Boys, I don't want you to stop until we reach the top of that hill. Forward!' GENERAL CARLIN rode his horse to the foot of the ridge and then turned him loose and scrambled up with the rest of us."

GENERAL CARLIN, in his report, records that he was ordered by GENERAL JOHNSON "to prepare to advance against the enemy on Missionary Ridge." COLONEL ANSON G. MCCOOK, he being then on the extreme right of CARLIN'S brigade, and so the right of GENERAL THOMAS'S storming lines, says: "About 4 p. m. moved to the assault of Missionary Ridge." CAPTAIN R. E. A. CROFTON, commanding the Sixteenth and Nineteenth United States Infantry in STOUGHTON'S brigade (the left of JOHNSON'S division) says: "Having covered our front with a line of skirmishers, were ordered to storm Missionary Ridge."

There was some momentary confusion of orders at two points of the line as to advancing beyond the rifle-pits, but even there the men rushed on, and without further orders, and by an inspiration of their own, carried the adjacent lines with them. But the reports, when analyzed, show clearly that whatever any others may have had in mind, THOMAS'S intention from the first was to start his lines for the top of the ridge.

GENERAL HOOKER'S operations at the south end of Missionary Ridge near Rossville were also of a brilliant character. He succeeded in bridging Chattanooga creek, and the head of his column, OSTERHAUS'S division, drove back the Confederate infantry and artillery, strongly posted in Rossville Gap, gained the

rear of Missionary Ridge and turned northward along its eastern base. CRUFT'S division ascended the ridge from the gap and moved at once on the flank of BRAGG'S troops, which extended beyond THOMAS'S right. GEARY moved rapidly along the western base of the ridge, and coming in sight of the right of THOMAS'S lines just crossing the crest, a half mile to the northward, faced his forces toward the ridge and scaled it. The troops attempting to escape from THOMAS, joined to those in position on his right, gave each of HOOKER'S three divisions some short, sharp fighting, but nothing could resist those heroes of Lookout, and here also the victory was complete, and many prisoners were captured. On the left of THOMAS fighting continued until dusk. BAIRD, on reaching the summit, wheeled to the left, or, rather, his officers and men precipitated themselves in mass upon HARDEE'S forces, which were attempting to flank them from that direction, and by dusk they were successfully beaten back. SHERIDAN, upon gaining the crest, immediately pushed down the eastern slope in pursuit, while WOOD was formed to resist attack from the right. BRAGG'S entire army, except the force to the left of THOMAS and in front of SHERMAN, retreated in disordered flight, saving but few guns.

CLEBURNE, before SHERMAN, had been able, even with his small force, to hold the bridge over the Chickamauga on his right, and when night fell he withdrew in order, saving all his guns and material.

Thus ended the grandest spectacular battle of the war—perhaps of any war. The Confederacy had been again as seriously divided as when the Mississippi was opened. Its most thoughtful officers saw that its doom was sealed. Troops from nineteen Northern States fought in the battle. The cheering of the banners on Lookout by those gathered armies was the voice of all the North proclaiming that there was no stronghold in the land from which secession could be successfully defended.



Comrades: There is in these gloriously gilded memoirs<sup>شعير</sup> a joy and a reward that nothing else in life can bring to us or replace. It is a past over which there has been and shall be an enduring sunset whose soft and entrancing coloring can never grow dim or disappear. And at the same time, doubling this joy and this reward, while the past thus glows in our memories, there is the sheen and the beauty of a morning such as has never before held out its bright promise to any nation.

For one, I believe that the vast majority of those who fought against us would, if foreign foes attacked, spring as quickly as any of us to the defense of our common flag. A quarter of a century has brought this about—a period which is but as a day in the life of a nation. He would indeed be impatient who looked for more speedy progress.

While we glory in the deeds of every Union army and twine laurel for the brows of all our great commanders, we glory most because our lot was cast with that army which was organized and baptized in battle by GENERAL BUELL: which reached its fighting manhood under GENERAL ROSECRANS, and which, under GEORGE H. THOMAS, stood immovable at the Kelley Farm and on Snodgrass Hill, stormed the heights of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and crushed HOOD at Nashville. We now write his name above all names, and when history shall have rendered its final verdict upon the soldiers of the Union, we believe that THOMAS will surely lead all the rest on the list of great soldiers and successful generals.









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